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Abstract— We propose a concept for authorisation using the
location of a mobile device and the enforcement of location-
based policies. Mobile devices enhanced by Trusted Computing
capabilities operate an autonomous and secure location trigger
and policy enforcement entity. Location determination is two-
tiered, integrating cell-based triggering at handover with preci-
sion location measurement by the device.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ambient technologies propose to enrich the mobile envi-
ronment with different computer devices and networks. One
use case is to utilise a user device for remote control of
other systems — to automatically turn on the light when
entering a room, or to enable access to the emergency controls
of a power plant while repairing the pipes. Often, a natural
requirement is to restrict possibilities to authorised personnel
in a certain location. Vice versa sometimes one wants to
restrict the functionality of devices based on its location, e.g.,
disable the camera while entering a sensitive area. All these
scenarios require location based authorisation and sometimes
access control, a subject which has attracted some attention in
the literature, cf. [1] and references therein.
The implementation of location based authorisation can be
based on various methods for location determination, e.g.,
triangulation (e.g. strength of the device signal at six base
stations [2], [3]), calculating the round trip time [4], or
deploying a GPS module locally to the client. The first method
lacks the precision, and the second requires new sensors to
be installed in the location-based authorisation enabled areas.
The last has not been deployed because relying on the client
side for location information is deemed insecure. Event though
hybrid approaches like combination of triangulation and GPS
exist, the latter argument applies to them. In conclusion
current approaches are generally unfit for authorisation and
access control based on location with scalable strength of
enforcement. We propose a solution, that combines three
technologies. First a network-side location trigger, which
only has cell granularity, and second a device-side enforcing
agent using de-central (e.g. GPS) or co-operative (e.g. A-
GPS) location methods and concurrently enforces the pertinent
policies. Third security is established by applying Trusted
Computing concepts of Attestation. Section II presents the
proposed concept on the level of functional building blocks,
architecture, and operational scenario. Section III defines the
required communication protocols and their integration into
pcs networks. Security and efficiency of the concept and
application scenarios are discussed in Section IV. Section V
concludes the paper.
II. TLTA CONCEPT
In order to fell authorisation decisions based on device
location, an entity called location trigger must have access to
location information and be able to provide this information
to other entities enforcing according policies, either on the
device or on the part of some service. The concept of an
Trusted Location Trigger Authorisation (TLTA) we propose
in the following, rests on these key ideas. First, the location
trigger in TLTA operates on two separate levels: i) Handover-
based localisation within a network cell and ii) GPS-based
(here always meaning either full, device operated GPS or A-
GPS) localisation within an area circumscribed by a perimeter
of cells. Second, a trusted entity on the device, called the
Location Trigger Enforcer (LTE), embodying the location
trigger functionality and enforcing, possibly in co-operation
with a network-side counterpart, authorisation policies. The
trust in the LTE rests on security properties of the device,
which we assume to be a trusted computing (TC) platform for
the purpose of location-based authorisation. The latter notion
is, for our subject, specified by the standards of the Trusted
Computing Group’s (TCG) Mobile Phone Working Group
(MPWG, see [5]). The necessary architectural principals of
the MPWG for TLTA are explained in Section II-B. It should
be noted however, that the TLTA concept is applicable resting
on any other trusted platform architecture which fulfils the
core requirements in the namely section.
In the following, we will take an agnostic stance with
respect to the actual restrictions that are to be enforced and
just speak of ‘the policies’ to be enforced. The next subsection
sketches the architecture of a TLTA system and security-
relevant assumptions. The state sequence of a device operating
under the TLTA scheme is developed in Section II-C.
A. Entities and their functions
We here choose the Long Term Evolution of 3G Networks
specified by the 3GPP standardisation (3GPPLTE, see [6]) as
the technical framework for the presentation of TLTA. Within
it, various improvements over common 2G and 3G network
architectures are specified. One of the aims is to simplify
the overall architecture. This flat, all-IP based infrastructure
is referred to as System Architecture Evolution (SAE). Meet-
ing technical and performance requirements arising from an
analysis of the current state of mobile technology resulted
in a reduction of the number of network nodes involved in
data processing and transport. A flatter network architecture
leads to improved data latency (the transmission delay between
the transmitter sending data and the time of reception) and
better support of delay-sensitive, interactive and real-time
communications.
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Fig. 1. SAE model and its basic components
The SAE model is shown in Figure 1 and consists of two
types of network elements. Access of user devices, called Mo-
bile Terminals (MT) is facilitated by enhanced base stations,
referred to as enhanced Node-Bs (eNB). They provide the air
interface and performs the resource management thereof. The
second class of elements are the Access Gate Ways (AGW)
which implement management functionalities and act as data
gateways for user packages. The AGW establishes connections
to Service Providers. Within this core network model the MNO
can offer different services, for instance A-GPS.
Figure 2 depicts the interaction between the basic SAE
architecture (shown as an MNO cloud) and the components
added by TLTA. The customer who requests the enforcement
of certain policies on devices in a geographic area, called the
protected zone, is termed TLTAC service requester (TLTSR).
The TLTSR handles for instance the provisioning of content
to devices. TLTA introduces on network operator side the
Trusted Location Trigger Authorisation Centre (TLTAC) which
establishes a pre-defined geographic area within the area
covered by the MNO network. The TLTAC receives (i) the
physical geometry of the protected zone and (ii) the desired
policies to be enforced within this zone (A in the figure). Based
on these data the TLTAC determines configures certain eNBs
of the MNO in Step B. After the setup TLTAC’s main task is
to authenticate the end users devices and to maintain a list of
them for authorisation purposes.
A Location Trigger Enforcer (LTE) is integrated in the
end users MT which is the device-side counterpart of the
TLTAC (The abbreviation LTE used in this paper should not
be confounded with Long Term Evolution in the context of the
3GPP). LTE (i) receives and holds the policies from TLTAC,
(ii) receives and holds the protection zone geometry, (iii)
determines entry and exit events to the protection zone by
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Fig. 2. Interaction of an existing MNO network and the TLTA components
some high-precision location mechanism, e.g., A-GPS, and
(iv) enforces the policies on the device.
After this setup, MTs entering the protected zone may
acquire certain services. The access to these services is con-
trolled by the LTE. The basic scheme is that the device which
enters the protected zone performs an attestation (see below)
of its internal state and configuration to the MNO (Step 1 in
Figure 2). If this attestation succeeds the device is registered
at the TLTAC (Step 2) and also registered with the A-GPS
service, or any other location providing service which is used
to determine the accurate location of the device (Step 3). These
registration steps are mainly required to protect the location
service against fraud and to enable certain payment methods
and schemes.
B. Trusted MTs
The TLTAC and LTE together form a Policy Decision Point
(PDP) / Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) related model based
on a local enforcement of policies. From the perspective of
the content provider the trustworthiness of the local LTE must
be testified and sufficiently strong. Therefore, TLTA requires
that the MT constitutes a trusted platform resting on certain
capabilities constituting a Trusted Computing Base (TCB),
which for the purpose of this report comprise:
1) Secure boot: The boot process is the time span from the
power on to the stage when the user is able to interact with
the device. Within this time span, secure boot ensures that
fundamental capabilities are in place which are critical for
the reliability of the system, comprising in particular means
for resource isolation and management. During secure boot,
as defined in [5], each component is measured in order of
execution. These measurement values are then verified by a
local verification agent using so called Reference Integrity
Measurement (RIM) digital certificates. If the values match
then the processing continues and the started component is
registered in a log as well as in a corresponding system state
register in a secure storage space. Otherwise the boot will
fail and the system switches into a failed state. In case of a
failed state the system may offer a Pristine Boot which as
a fallback. Pristine Boot defines a device state after initial
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Fig. 3. Mobile station travelling through the zones and perimeters of a TLTA system.
factory installation where the life cycle of a device begins.
Another use case for the Pristine Boot is an update process to
rebuild the required credentials (, e.g., RIM certificates) used
during secure boot. If the secure boot of an MT succeeds
the system on top can rely on the integrity of the system
underneath. This includes all subsystems integrated in the
platform including the LTE.
2) Remote attestation: A system which has performed a
secure boot process on an appropriate platform constitutes
a trustworthy base for other operations. This is not useful
without means to convey this state in a reliable way to other
entities. This process is called attestation in the context of
TC. TC uses two concepts to implement this functionality:
Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) and Attestation Iden-
tities (AI). A PCR reflects the system configuration reported
by the measurement entity and is protected within the Mobile
Trusted Module (MTM) against tampering. PCR values are
created by combining digest values representing the measured
component. Each value added to the PCR is also recorded
in a log. Log and the corresponding PCR value together are
testifying to the system state. To simplify the verification
process, the MPWG has introduced a device side verifier.
This verifier works as an agent close with the measurement
system and holds RIM certificates. An Attestation Identity is
embodied in a credential, and usually certified by a trusted
third party, e.g., a Privacy CA, to attest that the owning MT
contains a live, unaltered MTM. Producing the AI credential
together with PCR values and measurement logs and signed
by the AI private key to an external verifier, constitutes the
attestation process proper. The verifier, in the particular case
at hand, then has assurance that the MT operates an unaltered
LTE on top of a set of trustworthy resources.
C. Mobility process
The protected zone, denoted pz, is for simplicity taken as the
area circumscribed by a closed polygon in the plane which in
turn is covered by cells of the mobile network. Now, assign the
number 1 to all cells on the boundary of the closed, connected
set of cells covering the pz and call this set of cells c1 The
surveillance perimeter (sp) is defined as outer boundary of
c1. Call c0 the set of cells adjacent to sp, c−1 the set of cells
adjacent to the outer boundary of c0, and so on. Finally let the
outbound perimeter op be a closed polygon such that c1 ⊂ op
and dist(op, c1) > 0. This geometry is shown in Figure 3,
wherein, op results from simply scaling pz.
Before TLTA can operate according to a TLTSR request,
steps of device preparation and node configuration must be
executed. For the latter, TLTAC transmits a request to the
AGW which configures the eNBs of c0 and c1 to execute
the trust-enhanced handover described in Section III-A below,
when an MT crosses the surveillance perimeter inbound.
Device preparation is not required for trusted MTs already
equipped with an LTE, thus it reduces to LTE enrolment. This
can be done by secure software download, which is a major
use case for TC-enabled devices, at any stage in the mobility
process, e.g., when a device enters a c0 cell.
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Fig. 4. Network and device states during the travel.
Figure 3 shows the travel of a mobile device MT through
the zones. We describe this journey on a functional level,
deferring details of communication protocols and procedures
to Section III. The states of MT and the mobile network
relevant to TLTA are shown in Figure 4. At the point marked
(1), MT enters the mobile network in a normal operational
mode, with deactivated LTE and A-GPS functions. Upon
crossing sp at (2), the handover between a cell of c0 and the
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Fig. 5. Handover and attestation at the surveillance perimeter.
corresponding cell of c1 is augmented by the activation of the
LTE and the A-GPS, a remote attestation process, registration
of MT with the TLTAC, and download of the authorisation
policy, and the geometry of pz to MT. From there on the device
autonomously operates the location trigger to detect p using A-
GPS and with the aid of an A-GPS support server (possibly a
function of TLTAC). When MT enters pz at (3), LTE enforces
the policy, for instance unlocks a preassigned credential for
service access. During sojourn in pz, MT follows the policy
and can for instance use a LBS whenever the user desires.
At some points (4), MT may leave and re-enter pz and LTE
switches the enforcement of the policy off and on. LTE finally
releases policy enforcement at point 5, but is deactivated only
at crossing of op. At (6), LTE also actively de-registers MT
with TLTAC. The triggering of location is cell-based only
between points (1) and (2) and after (6), otherwise it relies
on (assisted) GPS and MT’ autonomous decision via LTE.
III. PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES
Here we present the technical concepts at the heart of TLTA,
namely integration with the handover at sp, operation in pz,
and release at op.
A. Trust-enhanced handover at the perimeter
The trusted activation of the LTE, i.e., the activation of the
LTE on the MT and a trustworthy report of that fact toward the
network, when the device crosses the sp, is at the heart of the
TLTA concept. The main idea is to integrate this process into
the normal handover of MT between a cell of c0 and of c1.
Various handover protocols have been specified, and here we
rely on 3GPPLTE, which offers advanced flexibility. 3GPPLTE
handover (HO) is divided in two basic stages, HO preparation
and HO execution. In the present case it involves an eNB
of c0 (eNB0) and of c1 (eNB1), as shown in Figure 5. This
process is augmented by two stages of remote attestation of
the MT, regarding the presence and activity of the LTE, in our
scheme. This design maximally separates the tasks between
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Fig. 6. Process after the activation of LTE and its interaction with TLTAC
the eNBs of c0 and c1. The first one, attestation preparation,
sets up eNB1 and MT to perform LTE activation and remote
attestation. The second one, attestation execution, is performed
after HO and does not interfere with this time-critical process.
When eNB1 is notified of an HO request of some MT,
it issues an HO response to eNB0, and additionally notifies
eNB0 of the necessity of a remote attestation of MT. The
sole task of eNB0 is then to generate and distribute a par-
ticular nonce, as specified by the TCG’s remote attestation
protocol [7], for this purpose to MT and eNB1. This is a
modification of the original TCG attestation protocol which
combines eNB0 and eNB1 into one verifying party. eNB0
issues the [TCG conforming] attestation request to MT, along
with the Att_nonce. The activation of LTE and attestation
thereof is concluded only after HO. This means that the device
loads the LTE (if it is not already present in its memory),
generates an attestation package [7], and sends it to eNB1
only after the initial signalling with this B-Node is complete
and acknowledged by the MT.
By attestation, eNB1 can be convinced that MT is in a
trustworthy state and has an untampered LTE present. It then
sends an acknowledgement to MT, including the signal to
activate the LTE for operation within the sp.
B. Protected zone operation and release
Registration of the device at the TLTAC and download of
the policy to the LTE on the MT are shown in Figure 6 and can
be initiated by the AGW, eNB1 or the device itself. We have
chosen the second variant in the figure. After registration with
TLTAC, and optionally the A-GPS service, the MT/TLTAC
pair can operate as a combination of policy enforcement
point/policy decision point of an authorisation system in any
desired separation of duties.
Policy enforcement can be divided into two levels for the
area between sp and pz and the interior of pz with two
separate policies called Psp and Ppz, respectively. Authorisation
decisions can be felled either by LTE alone or by LTE in
collaboration with LTACC in both cases. For the latter, LTE
would transmit with an authorisation request a binary attribute
to LTACC, stating whether the device is in pz or not.
The location trigger is operated autonomously by the LTE,
which periodically performs GPS measurements and requests
geopositioning from the A-GPS service. When the MT detects
entry to pz, the enforced policy is switched from Psp to Ppz.
MT can then, for instance, consume services from TLTSR.
Upon MT crossing op, it notifies TLTAC, which de-registers
it and signals the exit event to the A-GPS service (optionally,
also TLTSR could be signalled).
IV. DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss the security of TLTA, questions
of performance and practical issues, and finally sketch some
concrete application scenarios.
A. Security
The two-tiered architecture of TLTA naturally divides secu-
rity in two levels. Security on the sp rests on the integrity of the
involved B-nodes eNB0 and eNB1, which is a precondition.
Security in pz on the other hand depends on the separation of
tasks between TLTAC and the LTE. The security of the LTE is
enabled by the unique features of trust-enhanced MTs, namely
secure boot and attestation, features which are fundamental for
TLTA. When a registered device enters or leaves pz from or
to sp, policy enforcement by LTE switches between the two
policies Psp and Ppz above. We discuss the security properties
of the enforcement of Ppz.
The design entails that a security assessment of TLTA must
distinguish between policies for functional enforcement and
access control, respectively. The former means that certain
functions on all devices in pz shall be enabled or disabled. The
latter allows certain content or services to be delivered or made
available to the MTs registered with TLTAC. The essential
difference between the two is that, in order to extend functional
enforcement to all MTs in pz, LTE activation must be ensured
on all of them or the policy must be enforced otherwise,
e.g., by out-of-band measures and processes. Access control
is less security-critical. In contrast to functional enforcement,
an access control policy is effectively enforced by the TL-
TAC, which will yield access only to MTs with active LTE
accepting Ppz. In this case, LTE provides the added security
that proliferation of access to content or services beyond pz is
effectively prevented.
Functional enforcement in TLTA is susceptible to certain
attacks which do not apply to access control and whose general
strategy is to subvert sp. The simplest and most effective is to
cross sp and enter pz with a disabled MT, or an MT shielded
against network communication. Though one could attempt to
detect such rogue MTs via the network when they are activated
inside pz, this might not be very efficient nor effective. A
more sophisticated attacker could try to prevent the handover
at the sp, e.g., using a beam antenna to tamper the MT’s
measurement of the base stations. In principle, this kind of
attacks can only be mitigated by additional, physical access
control procedures on pz’s boundary.
A general caveat of architectures relying on a trusted
platform built upon a hardware security anchor like an MTM
is that it is more susceptible to side channel attacks than,
e.g., a smart card. Applied to the TLTA concept this argument
could mean to imply that, e.g., location data is tampered with
while in the MT’s memory or in transit between processor
and memory, respectively, the wireless modem. A hardening
of the MT preventing this could be achieved using secure
channels [8]–[10] (Texas Instruments’ proprietary M-Shield
technology is another example which could sensibly be com-
bined with Trusted Computing for TLTA and other purposes).
B. Efficiency
The activities during the central stage of TLTA, the entrance
to the surveillance perimeter, offer a great variety of imple-
mentation options. In particular it should be noted that though
we used (A)-GPS as a prime example, any other autonomous
or MT/eNB co-operative method for detecting entry to pz such
as triangulation, is applicable.
Let us briefly discuss the design choices taken in Sections II
and III. The de-centralised architecture and operation of TLTA
is designed with the central aim of reducing network load.
This is only possibly with the desired level of security and
enforcement if trust-enhanced MTs are used as central func-
tional building blocks. TLTA is loosely coupled to the top-level
of the cellular infrastructure. The TLTAC operates on the level
of the network’s Home/Visitor Location Register (HLR/VLR)
and Mobile Switching Centre (MSC) And could be co-located
or integrated with either one.
Signalling cost is a major concern for location management
in cellular overlay networks [11], [12], which poses similar
demands as location based authorisation. In our case, the
two-tiered method of TLTA yields the largest advantage in
this respect by leveraging the capacities of the edge of the
network. In particular communication with MTs at the sp
is completely borne by the eNBs and thus maximally de-
centralised, and moreover MTs operate largely autonomous
inside pz. Furthermore, the protocol is designed such that the
eNB of c0 is passive, its sole essential task being the generation
of the Att_nonce. This saves communication effort at the
stage of node configuration, since only the eNBs of c1 need
to be activated to handle entry events. Another feature is the
separation of inbound (sp) and outbound perimeter. It avoids
judder, i.e., frequent switching on and off of the LTE and
according (de)registration with the TLTAC.
A bottleneck could ensue if the physical access to the pz
is restricted, in the extreme case to a single cell and a large
number of MTs enters sp. This can happen in particular in
application scenarios for functional enforcement (see below).
This concentrates the load for the TLTA entry protocol to a
single eNB0, eNB1 pair. The problem can be alleviated by
a) organisational measures to distribute entry points over the
perimeter of pz, or b) shifitng the sp further away from pz,
i.e., to the boundary between cell layers c
−n c−n+1, n ≥ 1.
A third option is to introduce extra cells ad hoc, e.g., mobile
nano/pico-cells [13]–[15]. This is also an interesting option if
the network’s deployed B-nodes in the area are not capable to
execute the TLTA protocol.
Regarding the mobile users respectively device owners, the
forceful activation of the LTE is a potential infringement of the
proprietor’s power of disposal. A similar consideration holds
for Trusted Computing technology proper, on any platform. It
has led the TCG to mandate activation and take ownership pro-
cedures for the hardware security anchor TPM/MTM. These
concepts can sensibly be lifted to the level of applications
intimately connected with and depending on TC. Furthermore,
procedures for user notification and acknowledgement should
be combined with TLTA.
C. Application Scenarios
The TLTA technology is of basic character, hence it is easy
to envisage application scenarios in many sectors ranging from
general m-commerce to public safety. We note but a few.
1) High-tech trade fair: Functional restriction policies can
be enforced with exemptions. Consider a high-tech trade fair.
pz is determined by the fair’s host so as to coincide with the
physical entry barriers of the fair area. sp is a larger area so that
visitors with TLTAC-enabled MTs will already be registered
with TLTAC when passing the entry control. Ppz stipulates
that cameras and sound recording facilities of devices are to be
switched off by LTE. They then can freely pass through, while
unprotected (or non-networked devices, e.g., cameras) are
detected at the entry barrier and are confiscated. Countering
industrial espionage is another use case. A company may
use TLTA to disable MT cameras within the borders of
their campus, while keeping the MTs of visiting executives
operative for communication purposes.
2) Sports stadium and concert hall: The voice commentary
on a sports event is broadcast encrypted to mobile devices in a
stadium, which is the pz. Only TLTA-enabled devices receive
the decryption keys with the Ppz data managed securely by
LTE. The TLTSR and service provider can simply broadcast
the content and has no need to operate own access control
facilities. In a concert hall, the live audio broadcast should add
to the experience of the audience, and can be personalised in
terms of language and otherwise. This shall not be able to be
received outside of the concert hall, to avoid bootlegging.
3) Mission critical communication: MTs in a disaster area
can be configured to receive emergency and alarming mes-
sages. This can be used to inform the public or emergency
action forces but also to locate them within the danger zone.
Standard mobile devices can co-operate with the special ones
of action forces and inter-work over network boundaries, e.g.,
with TETRA networks [16], [17].
4) Mobile gaming: A game spread out over the area of a
city requires to adjust the device side policies based on narrow
location, e.g., when the user has reached a certain waypoint.
These scenarios have in common that they could in principle
also be realised by authorisation not based on location, e.g.,
organisational processes, yet with varying methods to reach the
desired enforcement level. The benefit of TLTA is a unified
authorisation method scaling with security requirements.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented a novel system for the enforcement
of authorisation policies according to location attributes. The
salient features of i) largely de-central operation, and ii) strong
enforcement level rest on a few key ideas. First, trust-enhanced
devices combine functions of secure location triggering with
with policy enforcement. Second, establishment of the pro-
tected zone policy enforcement is efficiently integrated in the
handover between cells. Third, location trigger operation is
two-tiered combining cell-based location with precision loca-
tion methods like (A)-GPS. These concepts optimally leverage
network and device resources and concurrently provide a high
security level. Potential applications abound, some of which
are only possible with TLTA or related concepts employing
trusted devices. Implementation of TLTA seems feasible and
economically viable, once TC-enabled devices become widely
available.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Anisetti, C.A. Ardagna, V. Bellandi, E. Damiani: OpenAmbient: a
Pervasive Access Control Architecture. In: Long-Term and Dynamical
Aspects of Information Security: Emerging Trends in Information and
Communication Security, A. U. Schmidt, M. Kreutzer, R. Accorsi (eds.),
Nova Science Publishers, Hauppauge, NY, 2007.
[2] G. Wölfle, R. Hoppeand, D. Zimmermann, F. M. Landstorfer, Enhanced
Localization Technique within Urban and Indoor Environments based
on Accurate and Fast Propagation Models. European Wireless 2002,
Firence, Italy, February 2002.
[3] P. Wertz, R. Hoppe, D. Zimmermann, G. Wölfle, F. M. Landstorfer, En-
hanced Localization Technique within Urban and Indoor Environments.
3rd COST 237 MCMMeeting, Guildford, UK, January 2002.
[4] J. Vidal, J., M. Najar, R. Jativa, High resolution time-of-arrival detection
for wireless positioning systems. In: Proc. of the 56th IEEE Vehicular
Technology Conference, 2002.
[5] Trusted Computing Group, TCG Mobile Reference Architecture.
Specification version 1.0, Revision 1. 12 June 2007. https://www.
trustedcomputinggroup.org/specs/mobilephone/
[6] H. Ekstrom, A. Furuskar, J. Karlsson, M. Meyer, S. Parkvall, J. Torsner,
M. Wahlqvist, Technical solutions for the 3G long-term evolution, IEEE
Communications Magazine 44, no.3, 38–45, March 2006.
[7] Trusted Computing Group, TPM Main Part 2 TPM Structures, Specifica-
tion Version 1.2 Revision 94, March 2006. TPM Main Part 3 Commands,
Specification Version 1.2 Revision 94, March 2006.
[8] A. P. Wise, Memory encryption for digital video. U.S. Patent
US2007140477 (A1). 2007-06-20.
[9] Data sheets from the ATMEL Corporation. http://www.atmel.com/dyn/
products/datasheets.asp?family_id=646
[10] J. Yang, L. Gao, Y. Zhang, Improving Memory Encryption Performance
in Secure Processors. IEEE Transactions on Computers 54 (2005) 630
- 640.
[11] I. F. Akyildiz, W. Wang, A dynamic location management scheme for
next-generation multitier PCS systems. IEEE Transactions on Wireless
Communications 1, no.1, 178–189, January 2002.
[12] D. Morris, A. H. Aghvami, Location Management Strategies for Cellular
Overlay Networks — A Signaling Cost Analysis. IEEE Transactions on
Broadcasting 53, no.2, 480–493, June 2007.
[13] C. Hartmann, O. Schlegelmilch, Hierarchical cell structures with adap-
tive radio resource management. 52nd IEEE Vehicular Technology
Conference, 2000. VTS-Fall VTC 2000. Vol.4, pp. 1764–1771, 2000.
[14] D. Molkdar, Simulation results of a typical GSM picocellular system.
52nd IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, 2000. VTS-Fall VTC
2000. Vol.4, pp. 1590–1596, 2000.
[15] T. Yamada, Another double tier to avoid local congestion in a unified
microcellular network. IEEE 16th International Symposium on Personal,
Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications, 2005. PIMRC 2005. Vol.4,
pp. 2232–2236, 11-14 Sept. 2005
[16] A. K. Salkintzis, Evolving public safety communication systems by inte-
grating WLAN and TETRA networks, IEEE Communications Magazine
44, no.1, 38–46, Jan. 2006.
[17] C. Edwards, Wireless - Building on Tetra, Engineering & Technology 1,
no.2, 32–36, May 2006.
